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GOVERNOR FOLCH AND THE BURR CONSPIRACY
EAT STRANGE EPISODE  of American history, the Burr con-
spiracy, can be considered nowadays a well-known story,
and the more so since the publication of Professor Abernethy’s
work, The Burr Conspiracy (1954). However, even though per-
tinent Spanish documents have been taken into consideration, the
usual tendency is to view the subject from the perspective of those
operating within the United States. Therefore, it should be an
interesting experiment to cross the Florida boundary and place
ourselves in the shoes of the Spanish authorities of that time.
Due to the heritage of colonial prejudices and the Spanish
intrigues in the West after the Revolution, contemporary Ameri-
cans see Spain’s hand in the conspiracy, headed by Aaron Burr,
Vice-President during Jefferson’s first administration. Although by
now enough is known to disprove the validity of this accusation,
historians still are somewhat suspicions of the Monarchy’s con-
duct. The fact is that such suspicions are not completely ground-
less, chiefly because of the attitude of the Governor of West
Florida, Colonel Vicente Folch y Juan.
The first news of the conspiracy reached Madrid through the
Marques de Casa Irujo, the Spanish Minister in the United States.
Burr approached him through a third person, sometime in March,
1805, while the Minister was staying in Washington, his per-
manent residence being Philadelphia. Burr asked him for a pass-
port to Mexico, but this was refused by Casa Irujo, who was
aware of the Vice-President’s “mysterious and frequent” confer-
ences with the British Minister.
Casa Irujo’s relations with Burr are usually considered with
suspicion. It would be misrepresenting the facts to suppose that
any friendship existed between them. When Burr set out for
Pittsburgh, the Minister immediately warned the Marques de
Casa Calvo, the King’s agent in Louisiana, to watch his move-
ments. Casa Irujo expressed the opinion that Burr was “astute,
clever, ambitious and an intrigant, without moral nor political
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Towards the beginning of August, 1805, the Philadelphia
press was already commenting on Burr’s projects. As a result,
Casa Irujo knew quite well that an attack on Mexico was con-
templated. But he considered that project ridiculous, and thought
that at the best it had been proposed to the British Minister, in
order to obtain some money from him.
As far as the separation of the western states from the Union
was concerned, the Spanish Minister thought it had to occur
eventually, due to the sectional struggle within the United States.
But he also thought that for the moment the West was not yet
ripe to maintain its independence. He considered such an event-
ually very favorable to the King’s interest, but that was about all
of which he could be accused. 1
Although the Spanish Minister to the United States was
contemplating the possible dissolution of this country, the main
preoccupation of the Court of Madrid was the protection of the
King’s possessions and honoring its international obligations.
Burr’s Mexican plans were not taken so lightly as by Caso Trujo,
chiefly since the Government knew about the trip undertaken
to the Viceroyalty by the Irish-born and Eton-educated Daniel
Clark, erstwhile consul of the United States in New Orleans and
land speculator. The seizure of his papers was even suggested in
order to gather more information. Casa Calvo was ordered to re-
main in New Orleans for the same reason. 2 Even before this,
on February 2, 1806, orders were sent to the Viceroy of New
Spain and to the Captain General of the Floridas, to arrest Burr
if he were found on Spanish soil. 3
Of all the King’s representatives, however, the man who had
to deal closest with the Burr conspiracy was the Governor of
West Florida, Folch. He was subject to the authority of the
Captain General in Habana, but as a result of the English block-
ade maintained by seven warships off Cuba, Folch had no means
of communicating with Cuba except through officers disguised
as civilians, who used American passports and embarked at New
Orleans on board neutral ships. 4 Folch tried to convince the
Captain General in Habana, Marques de Someruelos, of the need
1. Casa Irujo to Pedro Cevallos, August 5, 1805, Servicio Historico
Militar (cited hereinafter as SHM) Madrid, leg. 6,636, MS 5-1-9-16.
2. Cevallos to the Secretary of War, March 28, 1806, ibid.
3. Josef Caballero to the Principe de la Paz, February 2, 1806, ibid.
4. Folch to Someruelos, No. 59, January 6, 1807, SHM, 5-1-9-12.
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for an independent command of West Florida. He knew the
problems of the province much better than the Captain General.
Furthermore, communications with Madrid through Washington
were easier than by way of Cuba. But, of course, the Marques de
Someruelos was not to be convinced so easily. Folch also had
trouble with Intendent Juan Morales (accused of having increased
his private fortune by one million pesos while provisional Intend-
ent of Louisiana 5) who refused to reveal to the Governor the
extent of his powers. Folch was at a complete loss trying to deter-
mine his duties. Even knowledge about the funds in the Cajas
and the quantity of stored foodstuff was kept from him. This,
coupled to his lack of authority to make important decisions with-
out consulting the Captain General, rendered his position ex-
tremely difficult. 6 As Folch explained to his friend, General
Samper: 
. . . depending on a Captain General who resides at 200
leagues distance; (and considering) that these are occupied
by the Gulf of Mexico, that the decisions of the Captain
General take six or seven months to arrive, and that when
they come ill conceived, I find myself faced by the difficult
alternative of disobeying the Captain General or serving ill
the King; they are capital inconveniences which render this
destination intolerable. 7
Colonel Folch had governed West Florida since 1796. He
rightfully considered himself the man best acquainted with its
problems. He always showed extreme distrust of the United
States, because of its aggressive attitude. He considered ridiculous
the Americans’ pretension of comparing themselves to the repub-
lics of antiquity and attributing their amazing increase to their
constitution. He rather thought that the good fortune of the Unit-
ed States was due to the war in Europe and that the only way to
curb their arrogance would be by sending after the war a con-
siderable number of troops and ships to the region. 8
Folch thought that the Burr conspiracy was simply an at-
tempt to separate the West and Louisiana from the Atlantic
5. Folch to Antonio Samper, April 16, 1807, SHM, 5-1-10-2.
6. Folch to Someruelos,  No. 68, February 15, 1807, ibid.  The dubious
record of Morales did not impede his later appointment as Intendent
of Puerto Rico.
7. Folch to Samper, April  16, 1807, ibid.
8. Folch to the Principe de la Paz, March 23, 1807, ibid.
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states. He believed that if the United States did not change the
form of its government it had to break up sooner or later into its
component parts, such as New England, the Middle States, the
South, and the West. He believed the West was going to initiate
the process. At that moment this seemed to be quite logical and
Folch’s appraisal was sound. Subsequently the secession of the
South was overcome only when Lincoln modified, if not the
letter, at least the spirit of the Constitution.
Since the Governor of West Florida did not seem to see Burr’s
movement as a special threat to the Spanish Monarchy, the only
question was, what attitude to take in the civil strife that was
developing over the border. Washington would invoke internation-
al law. The Burrites would contend that the secession of the
West served Spain’s interests, protecting Mexico from the United
States. This would be in agreement with the former Spanish
policy, in view of the possibility that the new state would offer to
become a Spanish protectorate.
What attitude then was Spain to take in such a conflict?
International law prescribed a friendly conduct toward the United
States, but Folch thought the United States too often forgot its
international obligations towards Spain, as in the recent expulsion
of Casa Calvo from New Orleans. And if the Republic were al-
lowed to become strong and stable, it would mean the disappear-
ance of European possessions from America, Spain of course being
the country that had the most to lose. Therefore, Colonel Folch
proposed to maintain a strict neutrality and to decline any invita-
tion to cooperate, with the pretext that he was lacking authority
and had to consult first the Captain General. 9
This then was going to be the line followed by the Governor.
Undoubtedly, he well understood the problems his country was
facing in its relations with the United States. Maybe he was the
Spaniard who best knew the American Republic. But, although
General James Wilkinson (military governor of the western
territories of the United States, bribed by Spain and trusted by
Burr at the same time) was sending Folch detailed information
about Burr’s aims against the Floridas and Mexico, he refused to
believe the seriousness of the situation as far as Spain was con-
cerned, thinking probably that the Americans were only trying
to draw him into the conflict. As a result, he instructed Carlos
9. Folch to Someruelos, No. 63, January 8, 1807, ibid.
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de Grand Pre, Commandant of Baton Rouge, not to attack the
Burrites, unless provoked by them. 10
This policy of strict neutrality, motivated by a desire of
neither giving help to the government of the United States, nor
infringing Spain’s international obligations, explains Folch’s at-
titude in the incident that involved the garrison of Fort Stoddert.
On December 12, 1806, Captain Thomas Swaine, commanding
the Fort, wrote to Folch almost literally copying from Secretary of
War Dearborn’s November 8 letter to him. The Captain had just
received orders from Wilkinson to move with part of his troops
down to New Orleans. So, Lieutenant Gaines was sent to Mobile
to arrange the transit of the troops with Spanish authorities. 11
Folch refused to grant it, saying that only the Captain General
could allow the passage of the American troops. He also took
exception to the Dearborn-Swaine contention that relations be-
tween the two countries would remain good unless the Span-
iards should impair them. According to Folch only the Americans
could disturb the harmonious relations then existing. 12
The report that the Colonel sent to Someruelos in Habana
indicates that Gaines tried to convince him to allow the troops
passage by using as an argument the common interest of Spain
and the United States. It was suggested that Burr also threatened
the Spanish possessions. Folch seemingly did not want to believe
this. Yet he was of the opinion that the requested transit should
be granted to Swaine, if not for any other reason, at least to dispel
the rumors published in the newspapers about Spanish complicity
in the conspiracy. In his words: “I do not know, upon what basis
10. Folch to Grand Pre, December 24, 1806, ibid.  An example of Wil-
kinson’s messages reads: “New Orleans, December 6, 1806, Sir, this
will be handed to you by Lt. Marry of the Artillery who goes to Fort
Stoddert in charge of goods for the indian agency. I pray you to let
him pass without delay. Tomorrow I shall write you on a subject of
high interest to your Government by a messenger express. In the
mean time I can assure you on the honor of a soldier that every ar-
rangement making here, is as well to protect the dominations of Spain
as to support the government of the United States  against its own
lawless citizens. Tomorrow I  sha l l  be  more  expl ic i t  by  Gi lber to .
With respect and esteem, yours, J. A. Wilkinson. His Excellency
Governor Folch. Es copia de su original. Vizte Folch y Juan.” SHM
5-1-9-12 .  Prof .  Aberne thy  c i tes  a  le t te r  o f  the  same da te  f rom
Wilkinson to Folch and Morales (Thomas P. Abernethy, The Burr
Conspiracy [New York, 1954],  p.  176).
11. Ibid., p. 187; Swaine to Folch, December 12, 1806, SGM 5-1-9-12.
12. Folch to Swaine, December 13, 1806, ibid.
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they report it; but even in case it be true, it is convenient to hide
our cooperation until assured of the favorable outcome of the
enterprise.” 13
The Americans soon tired of waiting for Someruelos’ per-
mission. On December 26, Swaine passed through Mobile en
route to New Orleans accompanied by Lieutenant Murry, probab-
ly to confer with Wilkinson. Soon rumors started that Swaine
was under arrest for complicity in the Burr affair. At the same
time, late on December 30, Folch heard that the American
garrison at Fort Stoddert was on the point of forcing its way
through Florida, traveling aboard a ship that had been obliged to
unload its cargo of cotton. The next morning he called in the
ship’s master who had brought this news. On the basis of this
evidence Folch sent a courier to Stoddert at ten o’clock in the
morning. He returned at four in the afternoon of the following
day, January 1, reporting that he had seen the American troops
embarking on a schooner. On his way back, at half-past eight in
the morning, he heard cannon shots and supposed that this meant
the departure of the American garrison. It was exactly what had
happened. 
Early on Friday, January 2, the American ship crossed Pass
Heron. From there Captain Schuyler of the 2nd U. S. Infantry
sent a message to Folch, announcing his crossing of Spanish
territory. The Colonel, believing him still at Stoddert, answered
with a threat to use force to stop the foreign troops. He did not
know that they were already out of his reach. He had given
orders to the two ships in the harbor of Mobile which were more
or less seaworthy, the “Luisiana” and the “Vigilante,” to cut off
the Americans. But, because of weather conditions they could
not leave until daybreak of January 2. Naturally they arrived too
late and of course national honor was offended. Nevertheless,
Folch found it more diplomatic to forget the incident. 14
On January 3, Wilkinson wrote to Folch announcing Burr’s
approach “with his brigands,” and advising him to reinforce Baton
Rouge. He also mentioned Burr’s designs on Mexico and enclosed
13. Folch to Someruelos, No. 58, December 13, 1806, ibid.
14. Folch to Someruelos,  No. 60, January 6,  1807, ibid.;  Schuyler to
Folch,  January 1,  1807, ibid;  Folch to Schuyler,  January 2, 1807,
ibid.;  Folch to Baron de Feriet,  January 1, 1807, ibid.;  Folch to
Francisco Maximiliano de Saint-Maxent, January 4, 1807, ibid.
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a copy of Jefferson’s proclamation. Captain Swaine brought this
message to Mobile. This determined the Governor to transfer his
headquarters to the fort on the Mississippi, a decision he an-
nounced to Someruelos on January 6. Yet, he was ostensibly
going to Baton Rouge only to “discover the intentions of the
insurgents,” and he continued to give the appearance of paying
little attention to Burr’s anti-Spanish aims. 15
It was not until January 11 that Folch confessed to Some-
ruelos that the King’s domains were in real danger. However, he
believed Burr’s forces much more important than they really were.
He felt that Burr had committed a tactical error when he did
not send a secondary force of 2,000 men from Muscle Shoals
down on the Tombigbee. The Spaniards would have been obliged
to give up Pensacola and then retreat to Mobile, resisting there
while they could. At the same time Burr’s principal force would
have taken Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Of course, Burr lack-
ed the necessary troops to realize such a plan. 16
What were the reasons for the sudden change of opinion of
the Spanish Governor? There seems to be only one, namely the
information he was receiving about the plans and activities of
the Mexican Association of New Orleans. Casa Calvo had started
originally to observe these activities. On his expulsion Folch took
over. The Mexican Association was a branch of a similar organi-
zation in New York. Among its most important members were
Judges Prevot, Workman, Old, and Nicolle, Edward Livingston
(Burr’s debtor), Daniel Clark, Father Rodriguez, Major Nott,
and Lewis Kerr. It was said that the secretary of the Viceroy of
New Spain and three magnates were also in the service of the
Association. Each of the magnates contributed 100,000 pesos to
the expedition planned against Mexico. There were a number of
emissaries in the Viceroyalty whose task was to gain over the
“libertine priests and the friars known for their immoral conduct.”
The Association also pretended that a number of officers in the
Provincias Internas had been seduced, although there was no
actual proof of this. The Association did not fail to consider the
possibility of buying off Folch too. This proposal was defeated by
15. Wilkinson to Folch, January 3, 1807, ibid.; Folch to Someruelos No.
59, January 6, 1807, ibid.; Wilkinson to Folch and Morales, January
5, 1807, SHN, 5-1-10-2.       
16. Folch to Someruelos, No. 65, January 11, 1807, ibid.
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Workman, who warned against revealing the secrets to this astute
Governor, known as a staunch royalist. He felt that West Florida
could be taken easily anyway. And once that was accomplished
Folch would be left with the only practical solution of joining the
revolutionaries. 
The plans of the Association called for recruiting 10,000
men from Kentucky, 8 to 10,000 Louisiana militiamen, 3,000
regular troops and 5,000 Negro slaves who were promised free-
dom. They would meet on the Natchitoches river in February or
March. An expedition would be sent by sea to the Rio Grande,
under the pretext of quelling existing border troubles. Then the
Army would declare its independence from the United States.
Some 50,000 American families would be given lands west of the
Mississippi. 
Previous to this information obtained by Folch in October,
Casa Calvo had discovered the Association’s aims against Mexico.
He knew that Wilkinson and his staff were expected to head the
enterprise. The plan contemplated the occupation of Baton Rouge
and Mobile by the Americans, while a fleet from Jamaica would
attack Pensacola. Merchandise, 200,000 pesos worth, was to be
assigned to the Indians, and the army would enter Spanish ter-
ritory as liberators. Father Rodriguez had already translated into
Spanish a proclamation to be used when the invasion began. It
depicted Spain as Bonaparte’s puppet, against whose tyranny it
warned the Mexicans. There were some Mexicans at Natchi-
toches. Proposals were also made to the heads of the Negroes - 
Carlos Brule, Josef Cabaret and others-who consulted and gained
the consent of their old chief, a certain B.D. The Kemper broth-
ers, Reuben, Nathan, and Samuel (frustrated land speculators
who had already organized a revolt at Baton Rouge) were to make
a second try which actually took place on August 7, 1807. Agents
were to be sent to the Viceroy of New Spain, General Jose de
Iturrigaray, with the purpose of bribing a certain influential per-
son in his entourage (apparently the secretary). Iturrigaray was
considered to be completely inept. This was probably the mission
that took Daniel Clark to Mexico. The contemplated attack was
to coincide with the one prepared by General Francisco Mirando
to free Venezuela from Spanish rule. However, the Association’s
ardor declined somewhat as a result of Napoleon’s victories in
8
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Europe together with the rumor that Florida was being transferred
to France. 17
Since Folch knew of the anti-Spanish plans of the Association
from practically the beginning, it is time now to analyze the
reasons for his previous skeptical attitude towards Burr’s designs,
an attitude that lasted till January 11, 1807. It seems, Folch
felt that the Mexican Association actually represented the Govern-
ment’s policy which he also accused as being responsible for
Miranda’s expedition. (It appears, Governor William Claiborne of
Louisiana toasted its success in public.) Wilkinson was also known
to Folch as being mixed up in these plans. Furthermore, it was
rumored that the crown of the West would be offered to Jeffer-
son, Burr or a Mexican noble. In that case, the official warnings
received from the United States government and its representa-
tives in Louisiana of Burr’s projects had to appear highly sus-
picious. Folch could not very well accept in good faith Wilkinson’s
invitations to cooperate. When Burr was officially denounced as
a conspirator the Spanish Governor saw in this simply a split
between the enemies of Spain, a split that should be exploited.
Between January 8 and 11 he received some new information
which startled him into immediate activity against Burr.
In a letter to Intendant Morales, dated January 15, from
Delphine Island, Governor Folch declared, “three days ago
[there] has come into my possession the detailed plan which the
insurgents of Kentucky have formed against the King’s domains.”
This plan, in short, consisted of an attack on Louisiana and the
Floridas. With the artillery and munitions captured, Mexico would
be invaded by land and sea and its independence declared. Final-
ly, a new power would be constituted with the inclusion of
Louisiana and the trans-Allegheny west.
Since the principal immediate aim of the Burrites seemed to
be the capture of the Spanish artillery, and since there were not
enough troops nor fortifications to defend it, Folch decided to
send most of the artillery without gun-powder to San Juan de
Ulva at Veracruz, keeping the destination of the expedition a
secret. Most of the arms and munitions were to be concentrated
in Mobile, as well as the merchandise of the Indian trade. His
next measures were to order Colonel Carlos Delassus, the Com-
17. Folch to Someruelos,  No. 67, February 10, 1807, ibid.
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mandant of Pensacola, to send 150 men and some artillery to
Baton Rouge. Colonel Francisco Maximiliano de Saint-Maxent had
to send 100 men from the garrison of Mobile. The Governor was
also counting on the militia, hoping to gather about 3,000 men
for the defense of Baton Rouge. 18
These troops were ready to sail within twenty-four hours of
receiving the order. Folch preceded them by two days. He was
joined by some detachments at Pass Christian, and by the rest at
Bayou Nanchak. He had been forced to stop at Pass Christian in
order to clear the ships of the ten inches of snow that fell on
January 17 and 18. It was here that he received a letter from
Wilkinson, dated January 5, inviting the Spanish authorities to
enter into close cooperation with the Americans in resisting Burr.
This determined Folch to go to New Orleans, since he wanted to
get new information on the latest plans of the Mexican Associa-
tion.
As a result, Folch wrote to Claiborne and Wilkinson on
January 21, from the Bayou St. John where at daybreak he had
anchored at a safe distance from the cannons of the American
fort. He merely asked for the right to cross to Baton Rouge for
himself and his staff, while the troops would continue by boat up
the Iberville. Yet, both the General and the Governor refused to
grant the permission, saying that public opinion was in a state of
agitation because of Burr’s approach and the rumors of Spanish
complicity. Folch’s messenger, Lieutenant Carlos Reggio, came
back with the refusal accompanied by two aides of Wilkinson and
one sent by Claiborne. The American officers expressed the wish
to speak to Folch in private. When the Colonel had sent out
everybody, they invited him in the name of their chiefs to a con-
ference on the bridge over the Bayou, to be held the next morn-
ing. Folch did not try to hide his resentment about the insinua-
tion of Spanish complicity in the Burr affair. He thought that
the meeting proposed on a bridge was rather customary between
belligerents, but not friendly nations. He cited the way in which
he had received General Wilkinson on his way from the Creeks
to New Orleans. But he assured the Americans that he would do
his duty if Baton Rouge were attacked, and that they could count
on him in preserving the peace of Louisiana.
18. Folch  to Someruelos No .  65 ,  J anua ry 11, 1807, ibid.; Folch t o
Morales,  January 15, 1897, ibid.
10
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The American officer who was doing the talking for his
companions implied that Claiborne’s note was not to be taken
seriously. He was merely afraid of the cleverness of Casa Irujo
and Folch, feeling himself as placed “between two sentinels,” but
if the Colonel agreed to the proposed meeting, he surely would
obtain the permission to enter New Orleans.
The Spaniard parried, saying that to be compared to Casa
Irujo was too much honor for him but did little honor to the
Marques. Neither he nor the Minister could overstep their in-
structions, which called for friendly relations. Finally, a Spanish
commander would never implore something that by right had to
be granted to him. As one of the aides did not understand Eng-
glish, Folch repeated all this in French. The American then re-
tired. The following day the Spanish convoy sailed on to Baton
Rouge where it arrived on January 26. From there the Gover-
nor acknowledged Wilkinson’s letter of January 5. 19
Baton Rouge hardly qualified as a fort. Folch had already in
1804 described its weaknesses to the Captain General of Cuba.
Since then nothing had been done. Now he proposed to fortify
it by a moat if he received the money. 20 The troops under his
command were of high morale and well disciplined. But there was
no opportunity to try them out in combat because of Burr’s pre-
mature collapse. Folch attributed this collapse chiefly to the fear
caused by the Spanish vigilance. The Governor hoped that Burr
would receive the punishment he deserved. (There is no doubt
as to what his fate would have been had he fallen into Spanish
hands.) However the anti-Spanish activities were not to cease on




Folch to Someruelos, No. 66, February 3, 1807; Folch to Claiborne,
January 21, 1807; Folch to Wilkinson, January 21, 1807, Claiborne
to Folch, January 21, 1807; Wilkinson to Folch, January 21, 1807;
Folch to Wilkinson February 11, 1807, ibid.
Folch to Someruelos,  No. 65, January 1, 1807, ibid.
Folch to Someruelos, No. 69, March 16, 1807, ibdi. Folch describes
his troops as follows: Antes de terminar debo instruir a V. S. que
las Tropas destinadas a esta Expedicion se componen de una com-
pania de Granaderos del Regimiento de la Luisiana mandada por su
capitan con grado de Teniente Coronel Dn. Francisco Collell, con los
Subalternos el Teniente Dn. Rafeal Croquer, y los Subtenientes Dn.
Francisco Perez Muro, y Dn. Juan Dominquez: La mitad del Piquete
de l  Regimiento  de  la  Havana  a l  mando de l  Tenien te  de l  mismo
cuerpo Dn. Lorenzo Noquera; y el Subteniente Dn. Josef Valverde:
De la mitad del Piquete de Puebla mandado por el Capitan del mismo
Regimiento Dn. Antonio Salazar: Del del Regimiento de Cuba al
mando de Capitan del propio cuerpo Dn. Gabriel O’Ryan, con los
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That strained relations between the Spanish and American
authorities would continue was apparent. Wilkinson made an
appeal to Folch for the extradition of a deserter, Sergeant Dun-
baugh, on the condition of his being pardoned. Consent was given,
but this same letter of the General was the cause of new friction,
since he hinted that the testimony of the prisoner could clear the
Marques de Casa Irujo of any culpability. 22  Next, Wilkinson
demanded a free passage for the troops returning to Fort Stoddert.
Of course, the Governor of West Florida found reasons enough
to deny the petition, such as the previous violation of Spanish
territory at Mobile and the prohibition to cross American terri-
tory, despite the treaty of 1795 which assured to his Catholic
Majesty the free navigation of the Mississippi. 23
It is clear that those who considered Colonel Don Vicente
Folch y Juan as a staunch opponent of the United States were
completely justified in their opinion. Perhaps Viceroy Iturri-
garay’s dubious role would deserve a special study, as well as the
Mexican Association’s influence on the Mexican independence
movement. Casa Calvo’s later Bonapartist affiliation should not
be overlooked either. But it appears that the Spanish Minister in
Philadelphia, the Marques de Casa Irujo, was free from any cul-
pability in Burr’s conspiracy. The Spanish crown immediately
recognized the danger and as a result was ready to collaborate
Subat te rnos  Dn.  Fernando de  la  Rosa ,  Dn.  Josef  El ig io ,  y .  Dn.
Domingo Gallegos: De un destacamento del Rl. cuerpo de Artilleria
a las Ordenes del Capitan segundo Dn. Ignacio Salens. Todas estas
Tropas venian a las ordenes del Teniente Coronel Dn. Josef Maria
Morcillo Sargento Mayor del Regimiento de la Luisiana.
Ademas de los oficiales expresados han venido para ser destinados
a dirigir las companias de Milicias los oficiales del Regimiento de la
Luisiana siguientes: El Capitan Dn. Josef Canviosa y Adorno, los
Tenien tes  Dn.  Josef  Dec loue t ,  Dn.  Luis  D’Annoy,  y .  Dn.  Ci r i lo
Morant :  Los  Subtenientes  Dn.  Pedro  y  Dn.  Car los  Reggio ,  Dn.
Carlos, Dn. Luis, y Dn. Enrique de Grand-Pre, Dn. Pedro Keronir,
y. para Ayudantes mios los Subtenientes Dn. Francisco Morejon y
Dn. Francisco Dalcour. La extricta diciplina y buen orden que ha
observado  la  t ropa ;  e l  ze lo  y  ac t iv idad  que  han  mani fes tado  los
oficiales; y la constancia y pasiencia con que unos y otros han sob-
rellevado los rigores de una estacion la mas cruda que se ha conocido
en  es te  c l ima ,  hace  honor  a  l a  Tropa  Espanola ,  y  en  par t icu la r
a los empleados en esta Expedicion; y por lo tanto creo en Justicia
debido el recommendarlos coma lo hago a la Superior proteccion de
V.S.”
22. Wilkinson to Folch, March 27, 1807; Folch to Wilkinson, March
31,  1807.  ibid.
23. Wilkinson to Folch, March 31, 1807; Folch to Wilkinson, April 5,
1807, ibid.    
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fully with the United States. It was the Governor of West Flor-
ida, who, cut off from direct communication with his immediate
superior, followed a course that was hostile to the United States.
His attitude was influenced, not by an understanding with Burr,
but rather by the not completely unfounded suspicion that the
insurgents’ anti-Spanish designs were also shared by the Govern-
ment of the United States. Whatever the secret relations between
General Wilkinson and the Spanish authorities, the latter did
not trust him since they knew of his contact with the Mexican
Association. In the end, history has vindicated Governor Folch.
The aggression against Spanish territories condemned by the
Washington government when undertaken by Burr, was later
approved when undertaken by Jackson, Polk, or McKinley. But
Spain should have attempted only one of two possible policies:
to try to maintain at any cost the most friendly relations with the
United States, based on sincerity and good will; or, as proposed
by Folch, to pursue a course of unflinching opposition, backed by
military might in the Floridas. Yet, instead of these, the policy
became one of unfriendly relations without the necessary de-
fenses, and Folch’s worst fears were fulfilled: the disappearance
of Spanish authority from the New World.
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